Meta Model and a/v

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="2" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by Enrico</i>
<br />If everything is in a graviton flux, then any accelerated motion will result in a small but still real change in momentum relative to a background and therefore acceleration will be relative.<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

How does that differ from the situation in GR? In fact, relativists using the geometric interpretation of GR who ingore the background often argue that all acceleration is relative.

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="2" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote">If acceleration is relative, then it cannot be emprirically determined and it's frame dependent.<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

I lost you there. You just look at the distant stars and galaxies all around you. Any sudden, simultaneous change in all their doppler shifts with a sinusoidal pattern around the sky must mean one of two things:
(1) everything in the universe except you suddenly changed its motion by an amount that depended on its direction relative to you; or
(2) you suddenly changed motion and nothing happened to the universe.

Occam's Rajor cuts in favor of the latter choice.

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="2" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote">Then, acceleration in the Meta Model cannot serve as a real metaphysical cause of motion. If that is true, what is the real metaphysical quantity in the Meta Model?<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

I don't understand "metaphysical quantity" or the essentiality of its role in a cosmology. MM consists of substance and momentum (relative motion), and nothing else. Pointedly, it does not include any "empty space". Substances then collide and either accrete or break apart, exchanging momentum while they do so. All forces can be reduced to descriptions in terms of collisions of substance. -|Tom|-

TVF: I don't understand "metaphysical quantity" or the essentiality of its role in a cosmology. MM consists of substance and momentum (relative motion), and nothing else.

Any physical model proposed must offer a metaphysical underpinning of phenomena as a ground. Otherwise, such model is devoid of any useful context but it is just an abstraction. If MM is substance and relative motion, this is a certain space-time structure that is very weak in terms of causality.

It is well understood since the time of Newton that dynamics must be justified on the basis of real metaphysical quantities, and this is standard terminology used in the philosophy of science for many years.

TVF: I lost you there. You just look at the distant stars and galaxies all around you. Any sudden, simultaneous change in all their doppler shifts with a sinusoidal pattern around the sky must mean one of two things:
(1) everything in the universe except you suddenly changed its motion by an amount that depended on its direction relative to you; or
(2) you suddenly changed motion and nothing happened to the universe.


The problem is that what you are measuring is relative position only and you cannot simply determine whether you moved or the distance stars moved. But acceleration is absolute as determined by self referential rotating frames.

If momentum is the cause of dynamical motion in the MM, then in MM the cause of motion has no real metaphysical ground, that is is a hypothesis devoid of any useful context. I still think that acceleration may be absolute in the MM but I don't see how with a graviton flux one can get absolute acceleration empirically justified. I don't exclude that possibility though.

Please note that a true metaphysical cause is a cause that is empirically determined and this is standard terminology. For example, acceleration is a true metaphysical cause of motion as it is absolute and empirically determined. No relative quantity can be a cause of motion, such as momentum, because it varies in magnitude according to choice of reference frame and there is no preferred reference frame for the determination.

In this light, acceleration must also be the true metaphysical cause of motion in the MM but I'm still not sure if that's the case.

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="2" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by Enrico</i>
<br />Any physical model proposed must offer a metaphysical underpinning of phenomena as a ground. Otherwise, such model is devoid of any useful context but it is just an abstraction.<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

This strikes me as an absurd claim. However, it might make sense with the appropriate definition of "metaphysical". Please define that term as you are using it here. (Consult a dictionary to see why the claim is absurd with most definitions of "metaphysical".)

With my normal understanding of the term, there is nothing metaphysical about MM, yet it has plenty of useful context and is no mere abstraction. But I fear you might have learned the point you advocate from someone who thinks that useful starting points must arise from induction because of the "first principles" problem that deduction faces. If that is behind your statement, then read chapters 1 and 20 of <i>Dark Matter, Missing Planets and New Comets</i>, where I arrive at the opposite conclusion about successful methodology.

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="2" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote">If MM is substance and relative motion, this is a certain space-time structure that is very weak in terms of causality.<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

If you had read MM's basis in chapter one, I think your opinion would change if it is capable of changing.

By the reasoning presented there, the universe must be infinite in five dimensions, one of which is time. A key point about an eternal universe is that no point in time is special, so there is no such thing as a "First Cause". This is analogous to there being no such thing as a "first integer" in the set of all integers from minus infinity to infinity, even though every integer is finite.

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="2" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote">It is well understood since the time of Newton that dynamics must be justified on the basis of real metaphysical quantities, and this is standard terminology used in the philosophy of science for many years.<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

It is unknown to me, at least using that language. Can you say what these terms mean and a few words about why they are required?

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="2" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote">The problem is that what you are measuring is relative position only and you cannot simply determine whether you moved or the distance stars moved.<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

I explained how you could determine whether you changed motion. You cannot detect simple, unchanging motion simply because it has no meaning -- there is no absolute motion.

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="2" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote">If momentum is the cause of dynamical motion in the MM, then in MM the cause of motion has no real metaphysical ground, that is is a hypothesis devoid of any useful context. I still think that acceleration may be absolute in the MM but I don't see how with a graviton flux one can get absolute acceleration empirically justified. I don't exclude that possibility though.<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

I intend no insult, but your statements are "devoid of useful context" for me until I get those definitions. I really have no idea what your point is here.

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="2" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote">Please note that a true metaphysical cause is a cause that is empirically determined and this is standard terminology. For example, acceleration is a true metaphysical cause of motion as it is absolute and empirically determined. No relative quantity can be a cause of motion, such as momentum, because it varies in magnitude according to choice of reference frame and there is no preferred reference frame for the determination.<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

Okay, I'm trying to make sense of this from these fragments. I disagree about the value of resting a sound cosmology on empiricism, as I argued in my book, where I concluded the opposite.

Neither of us is claiming that motion or momentum is absolute. However, implicit in your question about the cause of motion (as opposed to the cause of changes in motion, which are collisions among substances) is an assumption that an absolute frame exists. If no absolute frame exists, then one needs no cause for motion because every unit of substance will have an arbitrary motion relative to everything else. Any substance in uniform motion relative to other substances provides the equivalent of a universal rest frame.

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="2" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote">In this light, acceleration must also be the true metaphysical cause of motion in the MM but I'm still not sure if that's the case.<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

If there is no absolute frame, then there is no need of a "cause of motion", but only of a cause for changes in motion. -|Tom|-

TVF:Okay, I'm trying to make sense of this from these fragments. I disagree about the value of resting a sound cosmology on empiricism, as I argued in my book, where I concluded the opposite.

This is basically the issue we are discussing. But the problem here is that the Meta Model is a substantivist cosmology. How can you reconsile substantivism with a statement about rejecting empiricism?

I understand these are difficult issues underpinning cosmological models. These issues were considered extensively by both Newton and Leibniz. Newton decided to refrain from hypotheses about the cause of gravity, which in the Meta Model is attributed to substantive actions. Leibniz reverted to the idea of God as the ultimate cause but also agreed that a substantive cosmology is problematic.

TVF: If no absolute frame exists, then one needs no cause for motion because every unit of substance will have an arbitrary motion relative to everything else. Any substance in uniform motion relative to other substances provides the equivalent of a universal rest frame.

The problem is a monster with two legs. I agree with you about the first leg. But the second is about the mechanism for transfering the momentum between substances in collisions. This problem was studied extensively by Leibniz. This is what I am saying, the problem is that a metaphysical real cause is still required to justify the transfer of momentum. Since momentum is a relative quantity, the Meta Model is faced with the following paradox:

I. If momentum is frame dependent, then it is not a real metaphysical property of substance(see below).

II. If it is not frame dependent, then it is a real metaphysical property of substabce and is absolute but this is in conflict with empirical observations.

However, Meta Model is faced with a greater difficulty: since it is a pure substantivist cosmology and (I) above holds, it means that substances under collision must have knowledge about the frame in which interaction takes place to determine the appropriate magnitude of momentum to transfer or accept. This is simply because, momentum is relative measure.

This presents a tremendus difficulty for a model like the Meta Model. This is one of the reasons coontemporaries of La Sage rejected the hypothesis of a material flux. I am sure you understand this difficulty which simply rests on the relative nature of momentum under Galilean transformations and therefore the lack of a real metaphysical cause of changes in motion that is empirically determined in the Meta Model. By simply stating you reject empiricism there is nothing said. The conclusion is that, in my opinion and evaluation, the Meta Model does not escape the need for an absolute frame. But this presents a problem because of the infinite scale and relative substantive nature of the model. The absolute frame cannot be a relative frame defined as you say, simply because empirical measurements vary in different relative frames. Although such definition assists to determine the first leg mentioned above, the second and more important leg is not answered and there is where the real difficulty is.

Are you proposing every mass in the universe knows what every other mass is doing? This sounds like "occult" to use the words of Newton.

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="2" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by Enrico</i>
<br />How can you reconsile substantivism with a statement about rejecting empiricism?<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

Thanks for clarifying the issues. I understand your questions and objections much better now.

The MM does not "reject empiricism", but rather gives it a different role. In my book, I cite examples of why induction from the particular to the general is a non-unique process, and therefore cannot be expected to lead to the correct cosmology. Instead, one must start from first principles and work deductively. Because deduction is a unique process, the deductions will generally agree with observations and experiments if and only if the first principles and deductions are valid. So a cosmology that allows one to deduce what we see is far more credible than one that adopts what we see and tries to guess the causes.

Example: We observe a cosmological redshift. Induction: It is caused by expansion, so the universe started in a Big Bang. (Eductaed guesswork.) Deduction (skipping the steps that get us to the graviton medium and the elysium): When waves in one medium (elysium) must pass through a second medium (gravitons), they will lose energy through friction. The energy loss redshifts the waves. Every observer in the universe will see light redshifted by an amount that depends on the distance it traveled before reaching that observer. (Amazingly, that happens to be true. But we didn't assume it, we deduced it. So we didn't need to guess the cause.)

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="2" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote">... about the mechanism for transfering the momentum between substances in collisions: a metaphysical real cause is still required to justify the transfer of momentum.<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

I still don't see what purpose the loaded word "metaphysical" serves in the above or later sentences, so I'll ignore it and answer the rest.

In MM, the transfer of momentum is always done through collisions or proximate interactions of real substances, in full accord with the causality principle. Momentum is always conserved in such collisions.

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="2" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote">Since momentum is a relative quantity, the Meta Model is faced with the following paradox:

I. If momentum is frame dependent, then it is not a real metaphysical property of substance(see below).

II. If it is not frame dependent, then it is a real metaphysical property of substance and is absolute but this is in conflict with empirical observations.<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

Regarding I: Momentum is relative, but certainly not frame-dependent. Any frame would judge the same relative momentum between bodies A and B. For MM, Proposition I does not hold.

Regarding II: Your statement notwithstanding, no substance has absolute momentum. (In MM, there are no absolutes.) Momentum is a property of one substance relative to another. It would be different with respect to any third substance. For MM, Proposition II does not hold either.

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="2" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote">However, Meta Model is faced with a greater difficulty: since it is a pure substantivist cosmology and (I) above holds, it means that substances under collision must have knowledge about the frame in which interaction takes place to determine the appropriate magnitude of momentum to transfer or accept. This is simply because, momentum is relative measure.<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

Although momentum is a relative measure, the rest is obviously not true. Nor should it be, given that Proposition I does not hold for MM.

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="2" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote">this difficulty ... simply rests on the relative nature of momentum under Galilean transformations and therefore the lack of a real metaphysical cause of changes in motion that is empirically determined in the Meta Model.<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

?? I assume the preceding clarifications render this confusing sentence moot.

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="2" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote">By simply stating you reject empiricism there is nothing said.<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

Referring someone to a reference for an explanation (as I did in my last message) is rather different from saying nothing. Even with the preamble above, you are certain to have a host of objections, which will lead to still more objections, etc. Only reading about the reasons for, and implementation of, this unique methodology can you begin to appreciate that the seemingly fatal problems discussed by Newton and Leibnitz have been solved elegantly in MM.

Upon reflection, in point of fact, it is not the Meta Model that is my contribution to understanding the natural world, because once the first principles were in place (none of which were my inventions), the rest followed deductively and uniquely, and could have been deduced by anyone. My main contribution is the realization that empirically-based inductive cosmologies can never be reliable, whereas a deductive one merely requires having an assuredly valid starting point. Having satisfied myself by deductions leading to absurdities that there were no safe assumptions other than the physical principles (which are products of logic, not experiment), the rest was inevitable.

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="2" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote">The conclusion is that, in my opinion and evaluation, the Meta Model does not escape the need for an absolute frame.<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

Until you truly understand why an absolute frame is impossible in MM, you will never understand the model. Two factors mitigate against absolutism of any kind:

-- the deduced infinity of scale; and
-- the deduced absence of voids or true emptiness anywhere.

But these are statements hanging from clouds. Read the model from the beginning and see why this must be so.

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="2" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote">Are you proposing every mass in the universe knows what every other mass is doing? This sounds like "occult" to use the words of Newton.<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

No mass in the universe knows what any other mass is doing except through contact between the masses or contact with agents sent from one mass to another.

Newton would very much have approved. -|Tom|-

TVF: Regarding I: Momentum is relative, but certainly not frame-dependent. Any frame would judge the same relative momentum between bodies A and B. For MM, Proposition I does not hold.

Relative momentum between A and B is different than momentum being a relative empirical quantity. I guess this is part of our difference. No cause of motion can be attributed to relative momentum because such quantity cannot be a property of substance, uncless a substance knows what another substance does. This is a fine and important point. The proporty of substance, for example mass m, is its own momentum mv, as measured with respect to some arbitrary reference frame in the Meta Model. A substannce cannot have infinite properties since infinite relative frames exist.

Consider a reference frame (I) attached to a train moving uniformly at v and a reference frame (II) attached to a stationary observer.

A stationary object m in the train has a momentum Pt = 0 in ref. frame (I)

In ref. frame (II) the momentum of the same object is Ps = mv

Now consider an accelerated reference frame (III) at dv'/dt. Relative to that observer, mass m is in an accelerated motion with momentum Pa=mv'.

Now, this problem is solved with a choice of a suitable reference frame resulting in consistent application of the laws of motion (inertial frame where the law of free fall holds).

But the issue remains about which of the three measures is a proporty of mass m and the arbitrary selection does not alleviate the fundamental problem. What it is called in philosophy a real metaphysical cause, the "loaded expression" you called it, is exactly that, a property of substance that is real in the sense that it is empirically determined.

In the Meta Model, since it is based on relative motion and an absence of an absolute reference frame, any deductions including premises deduced from the phenomena about the motion of mass m will result in conflicting conclusions for different observers. Therefore, relativity and deduction do not reconsile well unless there is an absolute reference frame that is all encompasing for any possible deductions that can be made regarding anything that exists and all possible observers.